The First Principles of Knowledge


Chapter Six of Norm Geisler’s book Thomas Aquinas: An Evangelical Appraisal (Bastion Books, 2013, 2022)

Copyright © 2022, 2013, 1991 Norman L. Geisler. All rights reserved.

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Behind the Christian belief that God has revealed himself to us in Scrip­ture (John 10:34-35) and nature (Rom. 1:19-20) is the conviction that knowl­edge about God is possible. With this the Christian as a believer is content. The Christian, however, also operates as a thinker, and so must ask the question: How do we know? Aquinas’s answer is that we know by means of basic principles of knowledge. There are certain fundamental axioms of thought by which thought is possible. For we cannot build a house of knowledge unless there is a foundation on which to erect it. Aquinas calls these foundational prin­ciples of knowing first principles.

The Importance of the First Principles

Aquinas believes that all knowledge is based on basic undeniable principles that provide the foundation for sure knowledge. Without these first principles there can be no true knowledge. As he puts it, “perfect knowledge requires cer­titude, and this is why we cannot be said to know unless we know what cannot be otherwise.”1 That is, if there is to be certainty, then knowledge must be based ultimately on some principles about which there can be no question. This means that there can be no infinite regress in our knowledge, for “if there were an infi­nite regress in demonstrations, demonstration would be impossible, because the conclusion of any demonstration is made certain by reducing it to the first prin­ciple of demonstration.”2 All knowledge, then, rests on certain undeniable first principles that we must study if we are to avoid ultimate skepticism.

The Meaning of the First Principles

In order to understand what the first principles of knowledge are, it is nec­essary to understand first what is meant by a principle. Then, the nature of first principles as “first” will be more readily understood.

The Definition of a Principle

According to Aquinas, “anything whence something proceeds in any way we call a principle.”3 That is, a principle is that from which something follows. A principle is to be distinguished from a cause, which is that from which some­thing else follows in dependence. A cause, in distinction from a principle, has diversity of substance and dependence of one on another, which is not implied in the principle. For in all kinds of causes there is always to be found between the cause and the effect a distance of perfection or of power: whereas we use the term principle even in things which have no such difference, but have only a certain order to each other; as when we say that a point is the principle of a line.4

So, then, there are two basic differences between a cause and a principle. First, a cause is not part of the effect, whereas a principle can be part of that which proceeds from it. Second, a principle is merely that from which some­thing follows; a cause is that from which something follows in dependence.

The Definition of a First Principle

A principle, by its very nature, is the first in its order, since all else within that order follows from it. “A first principle is, therefore, a first among firsts.”5 It may be first in the order of knowing, being, or becoming. That is, each of the various orders of knowledge or reality have their points of beginning; these are known as first principles if they have that irreducible premise upon which all else depends in that order. There may be other principles under this first prin­ciple, but the first principle is that from which conclusions may be drawn.6 Of course, a first principle “does not signify priority [in time], but origin.”7 It is logically (but not necessarily chronologically) prior to its sequent. It is the ulti­mate starting point from which all conclusions may be drawn in a given area of knowledge or reality. First principles are necessary constituents of all knowl­edge, but they do not supply any content of knowledge.

Kinds of First Principles

There are as many first principles as there are orders of knowledge and real­ity. Aquinas does not provide a complete list of first principles in any one place, but rather refers to the different principles by way of example.8 Since Aquinas is a realist, the realm of knowing is the realm of being. There is no disjunction between the rational and the real. Indeed, one cannot deny he knows reality without implying that he does. So then first principles will have both an epistemological and ontological dimension. Since a first prin­ciple is that from which everything else in its order follows, first principles of knowledge are those basic premises from which all else follows in the realm of knowing.

The most important first principles of knowledge are as follows.

The Principle of Identity. In the order of being (ontology) Aquinas states this principle in several ways: “being is being”; “every being is necessarily what it is”; “everything is identical with itself”; and “being and one are con­vertible.”9 Fundamentally, the principle of identity signifies the unity of things.

When this unity is applied in the order of knowing (epistemology), it takes on the form “being is intelligible.” For if it were not so, then “the human intellect is consigned to total absurdity, to the absolute inability to conceive anything whatever: every thought is unthinkable.”10

The Principle of Non-contradiction. The ontological aspect of this principle may be stated in several ways: “being is not nonbeing”; “it is necessary that being not be nonbeing”; and “it is impossible that being be nonbeing.” Epistemologically, there are at least two ways to express this principle: (1) it is impossible that contradictory statements be simultaneously true; (2) if one contradiction is true, the other is necessarily false.11 Aquinas justifies this principle by pointing out that being is intelligible; nonbeing is unintelligible and whoever denies this uses it to make an intelligible statement.12

The Principle of Excluded Middle. This principle is the principle of either/or. Ontologically, something must either be or not be. It cannot both be and not be at the same time and in the same sense.

Epistemologically, a proposition must be either true or false. It cannot be both true and false simultaneously in the same sense. “Whatever the subject, either affirmation or negation is true,” although we do not always know which is the case. In this sense “it is merely the logical consequence of the absurdity implied in a simultaneous yes and no about the same thing con­sidered from the same aspect.”13

The Principle of Causality. Ontologically, the principle of causality is limited in its application to the realm of finite, contingent beings. In this regard, “everything which is capable of existing or not existing has some cause; because considered in itself it is indifferent to either alternative, and thus there has to be something else which determines it to be.” Therefore, “since there can be no process into infinity there has to be something necessary, which is the cause of all things capable of existing or not existing.”14 In general, then, causality says “everything contingent is caused.” Or “every efficient action, which is a passage from potency to act, is caused.” Since it is contingent, it is possible for it to not be, and therefore it is caused or dependent on another.15

Epistemologically, every proposition that is not self-evident depends for its truth on the truth of another. Whatever is not necessarily true is depen­dent on some other truth. Of course, not every proposition can depend for its truth on the truth of another. Hence, there must be some first, self-evi­dent principles that are simply true in themselves.

The Principle of Finality. “Every agent acts for an end.” This principle of finality (or teleology) is the one Aquinas uses to develop many of his great metaphysical and epistemological theses. In its ontological form, finality states that “being as agent is finalized.” He wrote, “I answer that it is in the nature of every act to communicate itself as far as possible.”16 To act for an end is to communicate oneself.

Epistemologically, the principle of finality takes the following forms: every proposition has an end in view; it is necessary that every proposition com­municate some meaning; and mind communicates what is intelligible.17

Priority among First Principles

All of the foregoing principles may be said to be “first” principles. The question is which principle is first among the first. As Aquinas says, “Not every principle is a first principle …. Nevertheless, it must be observed that a principle of movement may happen to be first in a genus, but not first absolutely.”18 That is, while all of the first principles are first relatively, only one can be first absolutely. Before a determination is made as to which principle is first among firsts, the qualifications for this high honor must be examined.

As Aristotle defines it, “the most certain principle of all is that about which it is impossible to be mistaken. For such a one must be the best known … and non-hypothetical.”19 He first sets down three conditions for the strongest principle. First, no one can lie or err in respect to it. Second, it is unconditional. Third, it is not acquired by demonstration or in another like manner, but it comes naturally.

It is important to note that Aquinas and Aristotle are speaking of the absolutely first principle of knowing, not of being. In this epistemological context there are two prime candidates for absolutely first principle: the prin­ciple of identity and the principle of non-contradiction.

Some contend that identity is first. Jacques Maritain insists that the prin­ciple of identity is first and that the principle of non-contradiction is only a negative form of it.20 The reason usually offered in defense of the primacy of identity is that the positive must precede the negative. It is argued that first the mind has a concept of being. The first and most basic judgment, then, is that “being is being,” which is an assertion of identity.

Others object, contending that such a position confuses the order of judgments and concepts. The mind has a concept of being first; the next concept must be that of nonbeing, since that is all that is left. The first judg­ment, however, must be of the relation between being and nonbeing, which is one of contradiction and not of identity. “In short, the positive is prior to the negative only in the sense that a concept of the negative presupposes a concept of the positive; not in the sense that a positive judgment must pre­cede a negative one.”21

Aquinas holds that non-contradiction is first among first principles. Whatever may be said of other philosophers, scholastic or non-scholastic, it seems clear that for Aquinas (and for Aristotle before him) the principle of non-contradiction is absolutely first in the order of knowing. Aristotle writes: “It is clear, then, that such is the most certain principle of all; and what this is, we state as follows. For it is impossible that the same [attribute] should at the same time belong and not belong to the same thing, and under the same respect …. This indeed is the most certain of all the principles. Wherefore all who demonstrate argue back to this ulti­mate proposition; for by nature this is the principle of all the other axioms.”22 Aquinas agrees with this assertion: “And hence the first indemonstrable principle is, that it is not [possible] to affirm and deny at the same time; which is based on the nature of being and non-being; and on this principle all others are based.”23

Summing up, the primacy of the principle of non-contradiction is manifest since the principles of identity and excluded middle are dependent aspects of it. For if contradictions were possible, then a thing would not have to be identical with itself (identity) nor would opposites have to be different from each other (excluded middle). The principle of causality is also reducible to the principle of non-contradiction, for on inspection of the terms it would be a contradiction to affirm that a contingent (dependent) being is uncaused (independent). Likewise, the principle of finality rests upon the principle of non-contradiction, since otherwise being could communicate something other than being; intelligence would communicate something other than the intelligible.24

Finally, then, if non-contradiction is the only principle that is strictly first, why are these other principles necessary at all? Sullivan explains that “it is because they also may be called first principles, not indeed in the sense that no principle is prior to them, but in the sense that each is first as the source of that particular branch of human knowledge at the head of which it stands.”25

The Necessity of First Principles: Certainty and Certitude

There could be no certainty in knowledge if there were no certain principles of knowledge on which to build. But there are two sides to this issue: the objective certainty of the principles and the subjective certitude of the knower who knows the principles.

Objective Certainty

First principles are considered certain and infallible by virtue of their very nature. In this regard the adjectives used by Aquinas to describe them are illuminating. He calls them “necessary,” “indemonstrable,” and “non-discur­sive.”

First principles are necessary and indemonstrable because an infinite regress of knowledge is impossible. “For it is impossible that there be entirely demonstration of all things; for it would proceed into infinity, so that not even in this way would there be demonstration.”26 “For not every­thing can be demonstrated.” For “if everything were demonstrated, since the same thing is not demonstrated by itself but by another, there would have to be a circle in demonstrations. But this cannot be … or it would be necessary to proceed into infinity.” But, “if there were progress into infinity, there would be no demonstration; because every conclusion of demonstra­tion is rendered certain by its reduction to the first principle of demonstra­tion: which would not be if demonstration proceeded upward to infinity.” Therefore, it is evident “that not all things are demonstrable.”27

Aquinas sheds further light on why an infinite regress in knowledge is impossible. “As in the intellect, when reasoning, the conclusion is compared with the principle, so in the intellect composing and dividing, the predicate is compared with the subject.” So “if our intellect were to see at once the truth of the conclusion in the principle, it would never understand by dis­cursion and reasoning.”28

Since we in our present state of knowledge must think discursively, it would be impossible for us to know anything if there were an infinite regress of terms in our syllogisms. “The identity of the first object with that represented by the middle term cannot depend on an infinite series of middle terms; for no matter how far back one might go, there would still be a premise left to be proved.” Hence, “one must come at last to a premise which is self-evident: i.e., in which the identity or diversity of the two objective concepts is immediately clear to the intellect from a simple inspection of the concepts.”29 “C. S. Lewis saw this clearly when he wrote: “But you cannot go on ‘explaining away’ forever: you will find that you have explained explanation itself away. You cannot go on ‘seeing through’ things forever …. It is no use trying to see through first principles. If you see through everything, then everything is transparent.  But a wholly transparent world is an invisible world. To ‘see through’ all things is the same as not to see” (The Abolition of Man, 91).

Certainty in knowledge, then, depends ultimately on propositions about whose terms there can be no question; their truth is immediately known by inspection. These are often called “analytic“ principles. Aquinas defines first principles as those “whose predicates are of the nature of the subjects prime propositions of themselves; in order that they may be known of themselves to all, the subjects and predicates must be known to all.”30 And again, “the intellect is always right as regards first principles, since it is not deceived about them for the same reason that it is not deceived about what a thing is. For self-known principles are such as are known as soon as the terms are understood, from the fact that the predicate is contained in the definition of the subject.”31

It should be noted that although the predicate is contained in the notion of the subject, this does not mean that this is immediately obvious. It may become obvious by inspection of the terms of the premise or by a reduction of the predicate to the subject. For example, it is not necessarily obvious that every contingent being needs a cause until, upon closer inspection, it is seen that contingent means dependent and dependent beings must be dependent on something else (i.e., a cause).

In summary, the mind is always right about first principles, for they are known to be true as soon as the terms are understood, from the fact that the predicate is contained in the definition of the subject.32

Since first principles are self-evident, there is a sense in which it is absurd to attempt a direct proof or demonstration of them. Since some people deny their validity, however, there is an indirect sense in which some attempt to prove them. This is done by showing that first principles cannot actually be denied without absurdity. Aristotle lists several arguments of this kind in defense of the first principle of non-contradiction:

  1. To deny it would deprive words of their fixed meaning and render speech useless.
  2. Reality of essences must be abandoned. There would be becoming without anything that becomes, flying without a bird, accidents with­out substance.
  3. There would be no distinction between things. All would be one.
  4. It would mean the destruction of truth, for truth and falsity would be the same.
  5. It would destroy all thought, even opinion, for its affirmation would be its negation.
  6. Desire and preference would be useless, for there would be no differ­ence between good and evil.
  7. Everything would be equally true and false at the same time. No opin­ion would be more wrong than any other, even in degree.
  8. It would make impossible all becoming, change, or motion, for all this implies a transition from one state to another, but all states would be the same, if contradiction is not true.33

Despite the weighty defense given to this important principle, there are those who persist in denying its rational justifiability. Some insist that to defend the principle of non-contradiction by using the principle of non-con­tradiction is to argue in a circle. It is to argue against a position that denies contradiction by saying it is contradictory. But this is really to say nothing. It is simply saying that a denial of the principle of non-contradiction is con­tradictory.

But this objection confuses the issue. For the law of non-contradiction is not used as the basis of the indirect proof of its validity; it is simply used in the process of defending its validity. Take, for example, the statement “I can­not speak a word in English.” This statement is self-destructive, since it does what it says it cannot do. It uses English to deny that it can use English. So it disproves itself. The indirect proof for the law of non-contradiction is simi­lar. We cannot deny the law of non-contradiction without using it in the very sentence that denies it. For the sentence that denies non-contradiction is offered as a non-contradictory sentence. If it is not, then it makes no sense.

In like manner, if I say “I can utter a word in English,” it is obvious that I uttered a word in English in the process of doing so. But there is nothing self-defeating about using English to say I can use English. There is only something self-defeating about using English to deny I can use English. Likewise, there is nothing wrong with using the principle of non-contradic­tion to defend the principle of non-contradiction. There is only something wrong about using the principle of non-contradiction to deny that principle.

The basic laws of thought are self-evidently true. They are known to be such by inspecting their terms to see if the predicate is reducible to the sub­ject. The only direct “proof” of them is to state clearly their meaning, so that their self-evident nature becomes intuitively or immediately obvious.

First principles, then, are not only indemonstrable but are actually unde­niable. That is, they are objectively certain, regardless of the subjective cer­tainty we may have (or may not have) about them.

Subjective Certitude

Certainty and certitude are different. Certainty is objective while certitude is subjective. A principle is certain if it is self-evident, whether a person is sure about it or not. Certitude, on the other hand, involves a knower’s assent to that which is certain; it is a subjective response to what is objec­tively so.

According to Aquinas, once the terms of first principles are known the mind must assent. Assent to first principles, however, is not “free.” “Now the assent of science is not subject to free choice, because the knower is obliged to assent by the force of the demonstration.”34 Assent is “natural“: “If, therefore, that which the reason apprehends is such that it naturally assents thereto, e.g., first principles, it is not in our power to assent to it or to dissent. For in such cases, assent follows naturally, and consequently, properly speaking is not subject to our command.”35 In fact, Aquinas even speaks of a natural, unconscious inclination of the intellect to truth, a kind of “instinct for truth.” For “truth is the intellect’s good and the term of its natural ordination; and just as things without knowledge are moved toward their end without knowing it, so sometimes does the human intellect by a natural inclination tend toward truth although it does not perceive its nature.”36

The reason for this natural predisposition to truth is as follows: “Every­thing that comes from God receives from Him a certain nature by which it is related to its final end.” But “it is also true that every power has a natural appetite … with respect to its proper good … and with the exception of the will all the powers of the soul are necessitated by the objects.”37

Certitude about first principles, then, comes from the fact that the intel­lect is naturally determined to truth and we are not free to dissent. The rea­son the mind must assent to first principles is that they are reducible to the principle of non-contradiction to which the mind cannot dissent. “The first of all assents is stated as a modal proposition; on the other hand, all other immediate assents imply this first assent, and mediate assents can exist only insofar as they can be reduced to the principle of noncontradiction.”38

Certainty is always accompanied by assent. That is, the mind always assents to propositions that are certain, provided that it understands them. Not all assent, however, is accompanied by certitude. We may assent to something as being only probable and not necessary, as is the case in our everyday life. “In the business affairs of men, there is no such thing as demonstrative and infallible proof, and we must be content with a certain conjectural probability, such as that which an orator employs to persuade.”39 We may also assent to the conclusion of a probable induction but not with certitude. “For he who proceeds inductively through singulars to a universal, does not demonstrate, nor does he construct a necessarily conclusive syllogism.”40

There are different kinds of certainty, which can be summarized as fol­lows: “Assent with intellectual certitude is threefold: (a) metaphysical, wherein there is absolutely no possibility for the truth of the opposite; (b) physical; and (c) moral, wherein there is a remote possibility for the truth of the contrary, but we have no sufficient reason to think this possibility will be fulfilled in the situation at hand.”41 Further, “a man can possess intellectual certitude about a proposition and still fail to possess subjective or emotional certitude. He can emotionally fear the opposite, even though he cannot think the opposite to be a possibility.” For example, “a man can be abso­lutely certain that God exists and still feel His absence. Subjective certitude often works in the opposite direction as well. A feeling of conviction can so invade the rational powers that the will moves the intellect to assent where there is no sufficient evidence or where there is no real evidence at all.”42

Aquinas even acknowledges that a person may have certitude that some­thing is true when in fact it is not. “Now certitude of adherence does not belong properly to the act of faith; first because it also belongs to the intel­lectual virtues of science, wisdom and understanding; then because it is common to both true and false faith … for men do not adhere any less firmly to truth than to falsity.”43 It should be carefully noted, however, that Aquinas is not speaking here of intellectual certitude about first principles, about which there can be no error, but about matters of faith that are not rationally demonstrable. He is speaking of “certitude of adherence” or the tenacity of belief, not the veracity of it.

Nevertheless, Aquinas does admit that “error seems to be even more nat­ural to men as they actually are than knowledge because men are easily deceived and because the soul is longer in error than in truth during its life.”44 Frederick Wilhelmsen lists the causes of error as follows: “Diseased sensation, incomplete consciousness resulting from a lack of union between intellect and sensation, the drive of the will toward the good, the necessity to act without compelling evidence in the practical order—these are the causes of error.”45 But whatever the causes of error, it is not a question of error with regard to first principles.

Although Aquinas speaks of an unconscious “natural inclination” to the truth, properly speaking the assent to certitude is a conscious activity. We can be certain if we know that the truth is a first principle or reducible to it, which necessitates a rational awareness. Accordingly, Aquinas makes it a pre­requisite of assent that the relationship between subject and predicate be perceived as necessary:

Sometimes, again, the possible intellect is so determined that it adheres to one member without reservation. This happens sometimes because of the intelli­gible object and sometimes because of the will. Furthermore, the intelligible object sometimes acts immediately, sometimes mediately. It acts immediately when the truth of the proposition is unmistakably clear to the intellect from the intelligible objects themselves. This is the state of one who understands principles, which are known as soon as the terms are known …. In this case the very nature of the terms immediately determines the intellect to proposi­tions of this sort.46

So if we “understand” the principle and when the truth is “unmistakably clear” to the mind assent is necessitated and certitude is guaranteed. “Assent is a conscious discernment and commitment to the truth … assent is the mind’s ratification of the proposition formed.”47

But if assent is always conscious, why does Aquinas refer to an “uncon­scious” inclination of a subject or agent to its divinely appointed object or end?48 This point will be discussed more fully later, but here it might be observed that there is a difference between a natural “inclination” to truth, which may at times be unconscious, and a conscious “assent” to truth. It is when we consciously reflect on this natural inclination and the necessary nature of the proposition that assent comes “naturally,” albeit consciously.

Since certitude involves a conscious assent to the certainty of the truth for which we have an unconscious appetite, then the possession of this truth by the intellect is the reward of certitude. In short, “to reflection, certitude appears as the repose in the possession of this good, a sort of partial beati­tude of the intellect caused by the presence of truths, of which nothing in the world could ever deprive it.”49 The reward for the hunger for truth is the meat of certitude that we consciously enjoy when we perceive the cer­tainty and necessity of the truth possessed.

The Ontological Basis of First Principles

Itis because first principles are self-evident and analytic that they are unde­niable. For Aquinas, however, analytic does not necessarily mean a priori or independent of experience. First principles are known because the mind knows reality. In fact, these epistemological principles have an ontological basis in reality. For “a system of valid philosophy cannot be devel­oped from a priori principles alone by pure deduction, as Spinoza tried to do. Trust must be attained by a combination of principles, sense judgments, and the conclusions derived by reasoning from either or both.”50

For Aquinas it is sufficient that we know being (or that we know that we know being) and that in reality our knowledge of first principles is based in our most fundamental knowledge of being. He sees no need to justify this knowledge any more than we could directly demonstrate a first principle.

For thought is based in thing. That is, knowing is based in being. This does not mean, however, that there is a direct one-to-one cor­respondence between the thing-in-itself and the thing-as-known. In two clear passages, Aquinas spells out his view on this subject. “Whence, to the composition and division of the intellect there corresponds something on the part of reality; nevertheless, it is constituted in reality in a manner dif­ferent from that in which it is in the intellect. For the proper object of the human intellect is the whatness (quiddity) of the material thing which falls under [the perception of] sense and imagination …. Nevertheless, the com­position by the intellect differs from the composition in reality. For the things which are combined in reality are diverse; whereas the composition of the intellect is a sign of the identity of the things which are combined.”51 “So, since the true is in the intellect in so far as the intellect is conformed to the thing understood, the aspect of the true must needs pass from the intel­lect to the thing understood, so that also the thing understood is said to be true in so far as it has some relation to the intellect.”52

According to Aquinas, being is the beginning of knowing. It is a given, undemonstrable fact that ultimately thought is based in thing and that what the rational knows is the real. This is why Aquinas sees no need to elaborate his epistemology before his natural theology. He begins with a knowledge of finite being and on that builds his knowledge of Infinite Being. Further­more, as Eric Mascall pointedly observes, it is as unnecessary to expound one’s epistemology before beginning to talk about God as it is to under­stand human physiology before beginning to walk.53

Aquinas does not ask how we know that we know reality. It is obvious that we do. That is a question philosophers have asked since the time of Kant. Aquinas’s followers respond in two basic ways to this question. There is the school of Neo-Thomists, like Cardinal Mercier, Leon Noel, G. Picard, and others at the University of Louvain, known as critical realists. They claim that although we are certain that there is a world of things beyond our thought, nevertheless we must subject this certainty to criticism and establish the truth that we really know being. They contend that even though the mind begins with things, in philosophy we must begin with the mind’s knowledge of things and not the things themselves. Epistemology is a critique and a critique is logically prior to a metaphysics.54

Other Thomists feel that post-Kantian philosophy has made a gratuitous assumption in denying what is most obvious to the realist, namely, that it is something that we know and not nothing. Wilhelmsen, for example, says: “A Thomistic realist has no need to follow the fortunes of critical realism as it attempts to ‘bridge the gap’ between the mind and things. The Thomist refuses to admit any gap between mind and things. Therefore, he refuses to build a bridge where there is no need for one. He refuses to separate sense knowledge from intellectual knowledge because he finds them together, not separate.”55

It is argued that to justify our knowledge of reality by anything other than reality itself is to base knowledge on non-reality. “But if the truth about being is not strong enough to act as the foundation of philosophy, if it is not evident, if it needs a prior truth to guarantee it, then the absolutely first principle of philosophy will not be the truth about being; it will be some other truth.”56 Wilhelmsen continues: “It follows, therefore, that a ‘critical realism‘ is a contradiction in terms. Either the truth that ‘being exists’ is first among all evident truths, or it is not. If it is not, then realism is not realism …. The ‘critical’ swallows up the ‘realist’ in a philosophical comedy in which metaphysicians attempt to justify that what they say lies beyond all need of justification.”57

As a realist, Aquinas himself would respond to the question of how we know first principles are based in reality by noting that it is undeniable. For one cannot know about reality that he cannot know anything about reality, unless he does know something about reality. For Aquinas first principles of all kinds, whether logical or ontological, are not directly demonstrable, but they are indirectly undeniable. If they were capable of being proved, they would not be first principles. The only possible way to defend them is indirectly, by showing that it is self-defeating to deny them, or better, by indicating that every denial that we can know reality itself presupposes and affirms a knowl­edge of reality. “Just as the first principles are indemonstrable insofar as they are first, so also any direct demonstration of the ontological validity of first principles is impossible.”58

Garrigou-Lagrange argues that “this ontological validity cannot be demonstrated by a direct method, for, like the necessity of first principles, it is an immediately evident truth. The immediately connected subject and predicate do not admit of a demonstrative middle term.” Hence, “all that we can do is to explain the meaning of the subject and the predicate … for an attempt at demonstration would result merely in a vicious circle, since one would have to assume as true what remains to be proved, to wit, the ontological validity of first principles.”59 First principles may not be directly demonstrable, but they are actually undeniable. And it is a first principle that being is that which is, and that which is can be known.

The Epistemological Origin of First Principles

In some ways this discussion is logically prior to the preceding, since we can­not discuss what we do not in some way possess. It is also true to the order of Aquinas, however, to discuss what we know before we know exactly how we know it. In a very clear and complete passage, Aquinas explains the whole psychological process of the origin of our knowledge of first princi­ples:

So inquiry in all the speculative sciences works back to something first given, which one does not have to learn or discover (otherwise we would have to go on to infinity), but which he knows naturally. Such are the indemonstrable principles of demonstration (for example, every whole is greater than its part, and the like), to which all demonstrations in the sciences are reducible. Such too are the first conceptions of the intellect (for example, being, one, and the like), to which all definitions in the sciences must be reduced. From this it is clear that the only things we can know in the speculative sciences, either through demonstration or definition, are those that lie within the range of these naturally known principles. Now these principles are revealed to man by the light of the agent intellect, which is something natural to him …. So our knowledge of the above-mentioned principles begins in the senses and mem­ory, as is evident from the philosopher [Aristotle, Posterior analytics, II, 19, 100a 3-9]. Consequently, these principles do not carry us beyond that which we can know from the objects grasped by the senses.60

All Knowledge Begins in Sensation

All knowledge begins in sensation, but the mind’s ability to know is logically prior to sensation. That is, everything that is in the mind was first in the senses, except the mind itself. “But the human intellect … is in potentiality with regard to things intelligible, and is at first like a clean tablet on which nothing is written, as the philosopher61 says.”62 Again, “although the intellect is superior to the senses, nevertheless in a manner it receives from the senses, and its first and principal objects are founded in sensible things.”63 Nevertheless, the mind has an innate, a priori capacity to know, otherwise it would be impossible for it to know even first principles. This ability rests in what Aquinas calls agent (active) intellect.

The Need for the Agent Intellect

In order to arise from sensation, which provides as such only a knowledge of singulars, to a knowledge of universal principles, it is necessary to have the action of something that is superior to sensation as the universal is superior to the individual. Such is the agent intellect. “Truth is not entirely from the senses. For the light of the agent intellect is needed, through which we know the truth of changeable things unchangeably, and discern things themselves from their likeness.”64 Aquinas further describes the role of the agent intellect as follows: “The possible intellect cannot have actual knowl­edge of principles except through the active intellect. For the knowledge of principles is received from sensible things …. But intelligibles cannot be received from sensible things except through the abstraction of the active intellect.”65

In summary, then, the whole process of knowing first principles is this: “For the first principles become known by the natural light of the active intellect itself; they are not acquired through reasoning, but only through this … that their terms become known. Which comes about by this [pro­cess]: memory is taken from sensible things, and experience is taken from memory, and knowledge of those terms is derived from experience; and when these [terms] are known, common propositions of this kind become known which are the principles of the arts and sciences.”66

First Principles Arise from Judgments, Not Apprehensions

It should not be thought that the mind apprehends (first act of the intellect) first principles by abstracting their nature from sensible things. Properly speaking, first principles, as well as other knowledge, are to be found in judg­ments (second act of the intellect). “The human intellect must of necessity understand by composition and division [judgment].” It “does not acquire perfect knowledge of a thing by the first apprehension; but it first apprehends something of the thing, such as the quiddity, which is the first and proper object of the intellect; and then it understands the properties, accidents, and various dispositions affecting the essence. Thus it necessarily relates one thing with another by composition or division; and from one composition and divi­sion it necessarily proceeds to another, and this is reasoning.”67

“For the perfection of the intellect is truth as known. Therefore, properly speaking, truth resides in the intellect composing and dividing; and not in the sense, nor in the intellect knowing what a thing is. But the intellect can know its own conformity with the intelligible thing; yet it does not apprehend it by knowing of a thing what a thing is. When, however, it judges that a thing corresponds to the form which it apprehends about that thing, then it first knows and expresses truth. This it does by composing and dividing.”68

The intellectual knowledge of first principles rests in judgment made about the objects of sensible knowledge. First, by way of sensation and abstraction the intellect apprehends that things are and something of what they are. Then, by way of judgment the mind knows that being is and non-being is not. From these judgments arises the first principle of knowledge that “being is not nonbeing,” which is the principle of non-contradiction.

An Epistemological Problem

Out of a study of first principles, their certainty, and our certitude of them, there are posed several problems for a Thomistic theory of knowledge. Three of them will be briefly considered here.

How Can First Principles Be Known from Sensation?

“It may be objected that according to Aristotle [Posterior analytics, I, c. 13], the universal judgment from which all deductions proceed can be known only by an induction. And even St. Thomas might be thought to support this view [Posterior analytics, I, lect. 29].”69 This is the problem that was later accentuated by Hume and the empiricists: if all knowledge begins in sensation, if the mind is a tabula rasa at birth, if we have no innate ideas, then how can our knowledge ever rise above the flux of empirical experi­ence? Only flux can come from flux!

The answer, of course, is the agent intellect, which enables us to get more out of the data of sense than sense data. “In every man there is a certain principle of knowledge, namely the light of the agent intellect, through which certain universal principles of all the sciences are naturally understood as soon as proposed to the intellect.”70 Although all knowledge begins in sensation, it is not limited to sensible knowledge.71 What the mind knows by sensation is not merely its sensations but the essence of things in and through the sensations by the activity of the agent intellect. In fact, “there is nothing in the intellect that has not first been in sense, except intellect itself.”72

In What Sense are First Principles “Natural” Knowledge?

Aquinas refers to the knowledge of first principles as “natural“ and “not by acquisition.”73 Yet if these general principles must be known first in order to know anything at all, and if ultimately they find their origin, like all knowl­edge, in the senses, are we not arguing in a vicious circle? Are we not driven to accept either the Platonic theory of innate knowledge or Locke’s argu­ment that the principles are not known first at all and do not serve as the foundation of any other knowledge? As a matter of fact, Aquinas even uses the word “innate” of first principles. “The first principles of which we have innate cognition are certain likenesses of uncreated truth. When we judge about other things through these likenesses, we are said to judge about things through unchangeable principles or through uncreated truth.”74

Elsewhere, first principles are said to be acquired by a “natural habit,”75 a “natural inclination,”76 as “divinely instilled in us by God.”77 We are said to have natural knowledge of first principles78 or an understanding of first principles that “follows human nature itself “79 Aquinas speaks of the mind being “naturally endowed” with principles “not known by investigation” but which are “bestowed on us by nature.”80

All of this stress on “natural“ and “innate” would seem to be quite con­trary to the clear assertion that all knowledge begins in the senses. How can it be both a posteriori and yet innate? Gilson answers this problem by noting that “these pre-formed germs of which we have natural knowledge are the first principles …. To say that they preexist, does not mean that the intellect possesses them actually, independently of the action which bodies exercise on our soul; it simply means that they are the first intelligibles which our intellect can reach in starting from sensible experience. The intellection of these principles is no more innate than the conclusions of deductive argu­ments, but whereas we discover the former naturally, we have to reach the latter by an effort of search.”81

Other commentators are not so sure that this is all that Aquinas means by these statements on our natural inclination to truth. Sullivan suggests that “innate” and “natural” knowledge may also mean that first principles are regu­lative principles in all intellectual processes, and that they are in the mind when it begins to act.82 They do not precede consciousness but they are there in our nature when we begin to act and have God as their Exemplar Cause.

What Is the Precondition for Knowing First Principles?

The answer to the first two epistemological problems has given rise to a third, namely, if it is necessary to posit the agent intellect and a natural inclination to truth to account for the certitude about first principles, then how can we account for the agent intellect’s ability to recognize first principles or for our natural appetite for truth? Is this saying that the intellect unconsciously uses first principles (from the moment it begins to act) to come to a conscious knowledge of first principles? That is, are first principles the very categories of thought (to borrow a Kantian term) that are impressed upon our nature by God and with which we are able to think about things? There is a sense in which Aquinas gives an affirmative answer to this question. For first principles are the very structure of the rational by which the real is known and hence the intellect by virtue of its very nature is predisposed to truth.

Sullivan seems to make this point: “The person who makes the sense judgment is not explicitly aware of these principles at the time, but they may be easily and instantly elicited from him by questioning. Hence he may be said to possess principles virtually or habitually, from the beginning of his cognitive life. This is what is meant by saying that first principles ‘come by nature, and are known naturally.”83

If we take seriously what Aquinas says about “natural inclination” he would seem to be holding a form of realism, somewhere between an intu­itionism and a pure empiricism. He says, for example, “to say that a natural inclination is not well regulated, is to derogate from the author of nature …. In the same way, the truth of natural knowledge is of one kind, and the truth of infused or acquired knowledge is of another.”84

Natural knowledge is neither “infused” a priori nor “acquired” a poste­riori. It is known naturally because we have the natural capacity or “form” for it. Aquinas defines natural inclination this way: “Each power of the soul is a form of nature, and has a natural inclination to something. Hence, each power desires, by natural appetite, that object which is suitable to itself.”85

Furthermore, this inclination is not voluntary but is impressed upon its very nature by God. “Every inclination of anything, whether natural or vol­untary, is nothing but an impulse received from the archer. Hence, every agent, whether natural or voluntary, attains to its divinely appointed end, as though of its own accord.”86 It is described as a “natural appetite,” which again shows that it is part of our very nature to tend to the truth of first principles. “Natural appetite is that inclination which each thing has, of its own nature, for something; wherefore by its natural appetite each power desires what is suitable to itself.”87

Aquinas makes a significant contribution to epistemology. By a unique syn­thesis, he unites both the a priori and a posteriori elements of knowledge. Humans have an innate, natural capacity or form for the truth of first prin­ciples that is ingrained into their very nature by God. They have first prin­ciples in a kind of virtual and natural way as a precondition of all cognitive activity. And when this innate capacity is filled with the content of sense experience, we are able by conscious reflection to come to a knowledge of the very first principles, which as a fundamental part of our nature, enable us to have a consciousness of them.88 That is to say, we can only know first principles if we are exercising first principles to know them, otherwise, we would have no means by which they could be known. We have them by way of operation before we know them by way of consciousness.

Notes

  1. Thomas Aquinas, Peri Hermeneias, I, lect. 8.
  2. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, trans. John P. Rowan (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1961), 244.
  3. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, la. 33, 1.
  4. Ibid.
  5. L. M. Regis, Epistemology (New York: Macmillan, 1946), 378.
  6. T. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, la2ae. 66, 5, ad 4.
  7. Ibid., la. 33, ad 3.
  8. James Bacon Sullivan, An Examination of First Principles in Thought and Being in the Light of Aristotle and Aquinas (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1939), p. 235.
  9. Thomas Aquinas, Metaphysics, V, lect. 11, n. 912; WI, leer. 17, n. 1652; Sent., I, 19, 1, 1, ad 2.
  10. Regis, Epistemology, 395.
  11. Ibid., 388-89.
  12. T. Aquinas, Metaphysics, IV, lects. 6-17; XI, 5-7.
  13. T. Aquinas, Peri Hermeneias, I, lect. 11, n. 5.
  14. Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, II, 15.
  15. Aquinas never refers to the so-called principle of sufficient reason. According to some scholastic philosophers, however, he uses it in his “Third Way” when he argues from contingency to necessity (Sullivan, Examination of First Principles, p. 80). Others say that it is an epistemological aspect of the principle of contradiction. Regis, for example, says: “But the principle of raison d’etre, or sufficient reason, is nothing but the thing’s capacity to account for itself to human reason . . to be intelligible and understood …. However, the unintelligible has no raison d’etre, guarantees nothing, therefore is the foundation for no truth, however small” (Epistemology, p. 390). Leibnitz originated the phrase “sufficient reason” in his Theodicae (I, n. 44) and defended it, when challenged, in his Fifth Letter to Mr. Samuel Clarke (n. 125). Sullivan considers it to be broader than the principle of con­tradiction since the latter applies only to finite contingent being whereas “sufficient reason” applies to God. It says only that “everything must have a sufficient reason” (whether in itself or another). Causality, on the other hand, demands that every contingent being does not have a sufficient reason for its existence in itself but must find its cause in another. Sufficient reason, says Sullivan, tells us that there is a reason; causality shows us where it is (Examination of First Principles, pp. 80-83).
  16. Thomas Aquinas, De potentia, II, I. c; Sent., II, 34, 1, 3.
  17. Regis, Epistemology, p. 402.
  18. T. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, la2ae. 6, 1, ad 1.
  19. T. Aquinas, Metaphysics, IV, c. 3, 10056.
  20. See his Elements of Philosophy, vol 2.
  21. Sullivan, Examination of First Principles, 58.
  22. T. Aquinas, Metaphysics, IV, c. (1005b).
  23. T. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I a2ae. 94, 2.
  24. According to Sullivan, those scholastic philosophers who contend for the primacy of identity over non-contradiction “use quotations from St. Thomas favoring the primacy of the principle of Contradiction to confirm their contentions, and maintain that it is the same thing as the principle of Identity” (Examination of First Principles, p. 56). Sullivan traces the influence of the primacy of identity among philosophers to Sir William Hamilton (Lectures on Logic [1886]).

Regis observes that since Kant and the rule of the mathematic method, identity has had primacy. This is an exaltation rooted in a philosophical idealism that denies the concrete and makes existential being the starting point for philosophical reflection (Epistemology, p. 391). Along this same line Sullivan notes that even Descartes‘ cogito ergo sum depends on noncontradiction for its certainty because “consciousness can be doubted as well as any other source of knowledge. Moreover, even the judgment ‘I think’ presupposes the principle of Contradiction, for in making it one presupposes that one cannot at that time be not thinking; if one could, this judgment would be useless as a principle of further knowledge” (Examination of First Principles, p. 40).

  • Ibid., 96.
  • T. Aquinas, Metaphysics, IV,c.4 (1006a).
  • Ibid., IV, lect. 2.
  • T. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1a58, 4.
  • Sullivan, Examination of First Principles, 26.
  • T. Aquinas, Metaphysics, XI, lect. 4.
  • T. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, la. 17, 3, ad 2.
  • See Regis, Epistemology, 374.
  • See Sullivan, Examination of First Principles, 121-22.
  • T. Aquinas, Summa theolagiae, la2ae. 2, 10, ad 2.
  • Ibid., la2ae. 17, 7.
  • T. Aquinas, Physics, lect. 10, n. 5.
  • T. Aquinas, Sent., III, 27, 1, 2, c.
  • T. Aquinas, Peri Hermeneias, I, lect. 8, nn. 11, 15.
  • T. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, la2ae. 105, 2, ad 8.
  • Cardinal John Newman speaks of a series of converging probabilities that can yield certainty and demand assent (Grammar of Assent [London: Longmans, Green, 1987], 72), butAquinas does not speak of rational certitude in this sense.
  • Frederick D. Wilhelmsen, Man’s Knowledge of Reality: An Introduction to Thomistic Epistemology (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1956), 171.
  • Ibid., pp. 172-73.
  • T. Aquinas, Peri Hermeneias, I, lect. 8, nn. 8,19-21.
  • T. Aquinas, De anima, III, lect. 4, n. 624; cf. Summa contra Gentiles, I, 4.
  • Wilhelmsen, Man’s Knowledge of Reality, 179.
  • T. Aquinas, De veritate, XIV, 1, c.
  • Wilhelmsen, Man’s Knowledge of Reality, 157.
  • T. Aquinas, Physics, lect. 10, n. 5.
  • Wilhelmsen, Man’s Knowledge of Reality, 419.
  • Sullivan, Examination of First Principles,30.
  • T. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, la. 85, 5, ad 3.
  • Ibid., la. 16, 1.
  • Thomas Aquinas, Existence and Analogy (New York: Longmans, 1945), 45.
  • See Fernand Van Steenberghen, Epistemology (New York: Wagner, 1949), for further elaboration of this view.
  • Wilhelmsen, Man’s Knowledge of Reality, 40.
  • Ibid.
  • Ibid., 41.
  • Sullivan, Examination of First Principles, 98.
  • R. Garrigou-Lagrange, God: His Existence and His Nature (St. Louis, Mo.: Herder, 1945), vol. 1, 117.
  • T. Aquinas, De Trinitate, V, 4, c.
  • Aristotle, De anima, III, 4 (430a 1).
  • T. Aquinas, Summa theologise, la. 79,2.
  • Ibid., la. 84, 8, ad 1.
  • Ibid., la. 84, 6, ad 1.
  • Aristotle, De anima, III, 4, ad 6.
  • T. Aquinas, Metaphysics, IV, lect. 6, c 599.
  • T. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, la. 85, 5.
  • Ibid., la. 16, 2.
  • Sullivan, Examination of First Principles, p. 21.
  • Regis, Epistemology, 376.
  • T. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, la. 84, 6, ad 1.
  • Etienne Gilson, The Unity of Philosophical Experience (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1965), 308.
  • T. Aquinas, Metaphysics, IV, lect. 6, 2 (476B).
  • T. Aquinas, De veritate, 10, 6, ad 6.
  • T. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, la2ae. 51, 1.
  • Ibid., la. 103, 8; 80, 1, ad 3; 77, 3; 78, 1, ad 3.
  • T. Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, I, 7; III, 47; Summa Theologiae, I, 105, 3.
  • T. Aquinas, Commentary on the Book of Job, lect. 3.
  • T. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, la2ae. 5, 4, ad 3.
  • Ibid., la. 79, 12.
  • Etienne Gilson, The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas (St. Louis, Mo.: Herder, 1937), 246.
  • Sullivan, Examination of First Principles, 136.
  • Ibid., 33.
  • T. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, la. 60, 1, ad 3.
  • Ibid., la. 80, 1, ad 3; cf. 77, 3; 78, 1, ad 3.
  • Ibid., la. 103, 8.
  • Ibid., la. 78, 1, ad 3.

Advice to Aspiring Apologists and Philosophers


Here are some of the recommendations Dr. Geisler has made over the last few years when various students requested his advice on becoming more effective Christian apologists and/or Christian philosophers.


Only one book, the Bible, I read to believe. All other books I only consider.

Either the Bible will keep you from sin, or sin will keep you from the Bible.

I recommend earning a Master’s degree in either philosophy or apologetics from a solid Christian School.  I recommend Veritas Evangelical Seminary (http://VIU.VES.edu) and Southern Evangelical Seminary (http://SES.edu). I co-founded both.

I would take the courses in this order:  Apologetics, Cults, World Religions, Logic, Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, Modern and Contemporary Philosophy. Ask for one course at a time if that’s all you do.  Listen to the lectures, read the texts, write the papers, pass the exams.  When you finish, you will have a good handle on the core apologetics courses.  I guarantee you will be better prepared to do apologetics.

Take a course in logic at your university.  Or take it by extension from VIU.VES.edu or SES.edu. You may be able to purchase and download MP3 versions of my lectures from a logic course I taught by visiting http://NGIM.org. You can get a twelve-minute sample of that course here. Also read our companion book Come Let us Reason: An Introduction to Logical Thinking.

After getting a foundation in logic, start reading books by thomistic philosopher like Joseph Owens, James Collins, and Etienne Gilson. Joseph Owen’s An Elementary Christian Metaphysics is a good place to start. Then read Etienne Gilson’s Being and Some Philosophers.

The rest of what you need we teach at VIU.VES.edu, namely, metaphysics, the history of philosophy, and epistemology. VIU.VES.edu uses my two volumes on the history of philosophy in their courses. You can find the same books here:

Scroll down on http://normangeisler.com/about/ to see a list of all the 100+ books I’ve written. In particular, master the “twelve points that show Christianity is true” schema. The e-book of Twelve Points that Shows Christianity is True is available at amazon.com and ngim.org.  As of 20218, the “Introduction to Apologetics” course at Veritas International University (http://viu.ves.edu)  focuses on the twelve points. We should have the MP3s that go with the 12 Points course available on http://NGIM.org soon.  Our books I Don’t Have Enough Faith to be an Atheist (Geisler and Turek) and Reasons for Belief (Geisler and Tunnicliffe) also are built on my twelve-point framework. Also be sure to get Introduction to Philosophy, Christian Apologetics,  Philosophy of Religionand either The Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics or The Big Book of Christian Apologetics. Also you can find many of my e-books at a very inexpensive price at http://bastionbooks.com and/or Amazon.com.

Also master my chapters on the preconditions of doing theology. They’re found in the prolegomena of my Systematic Theology. If your approach to understanding the Bible is aberrant, your theology is going to become aberrant. That’s why it’s important to understand God as the metaphysical precondition, miracles as the supernatural precondition, revelation as a precondition, logic as the rational precondition, meaning and the semantical precondition, truth and the epistemological precondition, exclusivism and the oppositional precondition, language and the linguistic precondition, interpretation and the hermeneutical precondition, historiography and the historical precondition, and the methodological precondition. These preconditions are at the heart of the defense of the gospel and the biblical faith. Many of the theology courses at Veritas Evangelical Seminary use my systematic theology as the primary text. Their “Prolegomena and Bibliology” course covers these preconditions.

Since defending the faith often means defending it from corrosive philosophies, I highly recommend reading booklet Beware of Philosophy. I wrote this as a warning to biblical scholars and delivered it to the Evangelical Theological Society when I was its president. It’s just as applicable to apologists and philosophers as it is to biblical scholars. Similarly, read Explaining Biblical Inerrancy to help keep you from drifting.

I also recommend that you read all of C.S. Lewis’s major apologetics books–Mere Christianity, Miracles, The Problem of Pain, The Great Divorce, and God in the Dock.

Every great idea I ever had I later discovered had already been stated by Aquinas.

Read all the classics first: Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Hume, Kant in philosophy. Then study Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas, Calvin, Francis Turretin, C. Hodge, and C.S. Lewis. Then, if you have time, read the best secondary sources on these men.

The Bible says, “Whatever your hand finds to do, do with all your heart.”  You won’t be happy or fulfilled outside of God’s will.  And God’s will is for you to use your talents and abilities to live according to God’s Word in the context in which he has placed you.  But even God cannot steer a parked car.  You have to be moving before he can direct you.  Also, “In the multitude of counsel there is wisdom.”  Ask yourself: what do godly people who know you best (starting with your spouse) think you ought to do?  Spurgeon said, God’s call on your life consists of four things: 1) Do you have a strong desire to do it? 2)  Do you have the ability to do it?  3) Do you have success when you do it?  And 4) do other people recognize you have the ability to do it?

Remember that God has four answers to prayer: Yes, No, Wait, or “Here is something better.”

 

Thomism is the antidote to modern philosophy and post-modern philosophy. For Christian thinkers who start to appreciate Thomistic philosophy and want to go deeper into Thomism, I have additional recommendations. I already recommended the reading of books by Joseph Owens, James Collins, and Etienne Gilson.  I’ll add Jacques Maritain, Alasdair, MacIntyre, and Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange to that list. It is important to understand that Thomism in the 20th century split into two basic camps–the existentialist Thomists (which has nothing to do with the existentialism of Kierkegaard) and the transcendental Thomists (which attempts to integrate phenomenology with Thomism). I recommend the former and not the latter. Broadly speaking today there are seven different schools of “Neo-Thomistic” thought. In no certain order, they are: (1) Neo-Scholastic Thomism, (2) Cracow Circle Thomism, (3) Existential Thomism, (4) River Forest Thomism or Aristotelian Thomism, (5) Transcendental Thomism, (6) Lublin Thomism or Phenomenological Thomism, and (7) Analytical Thomism. I recommend the writings of the Existential Thomists first and the Neo-Scholastic Thomists second. I recommend avoiding the writings of the Transcendental and Phenomenological varieties of Neo-Thomist thinkers as they have too much compromise with Heidegger and Kant.   

First, read my updated book on Aquinas. It was originally titled Thomas Aquinas: An Evangelical Appraisal. The updated and expanded revision is better and is titled Should Old Aquinas be Forgotten?

Second, I recommend Etienne Gilson the most because he is the most scholarly. Some find him easier to read than Joseph Owens. After reading Gilson’s Being and Some Philosophers, read his God and Philosophy. This is so brilliant because of making the connection between God and being.  God is being! This is the genius of Christian philosophy that the Greek philosophers did not have.

Third, read Jacques Maritain books. They’re very good and eloquent, but not as good as Gilson.
 
Fourth, read Réginald Marie Garrigou-Lagrange’s books.
 
Fifth, read Joseph Owens’s An Elementary Christian Metaphysics and A History of Ancient Philosophy.
 
At some point you will want to read Aquinas’ own writings!
Get the translation by Maurer of Aquinas’s On Being and Essence.  It is the most readable. Also read Aquinas’ Summa contra Gentiles. It is easier to master than the Summa Theologica.
 
Medieval Philosophy: A History Of Philosophy  2011
   by Armand A. Maurer (Author), Etienne Gilson (Editor)
 
Author: James Collins. Everything he wrote is good but especially consider his A History of Modern European Philosophy.
 
The Principle of Analogy in Protestant and Catholic Theology
   by Battista Mondin
 

Mortimer Adler’s books, especially Six Great Ideas.

 

 


Interview with Dr. Geisler regarding Thomas Aquinas


Thomas Aquinas: Christian History Interview – He’s Our Man
Evangelicals can embrace a rich inheritance from Aquinas.
by Norman L. Geisler
 
In a 1974 Christianity Today article marking the 700th anniversary of Aquinas’s death, author Ronald Nash said some nice things about the deceased but ultimately judged his system of thought “unsuitable for a biblically centered Christian philosophy” and “beyond any hope of salvage.” Norman Geisler disagreed with that assessment then, and he disagrees with it now. We asked Dr. Geisler, president of Southern Evangelical Seminary and author of Thomas Aquinas: An Evangelical Appraisal (Baker, 1991), for his evaluation of the Angelic Doctor. . .
 
 
 
sm-ThomasAquinasForgotten1
 
 
For additional resources by Dr. Geisler on Roman Catholicism, please visit http://normangeisler.com/rcc/.
 

A Response to Philosophical Postmodernism


A Response to Philosophical Postmodernism

by Norman L. Geisler

 

A Brief Background of Postmodernism

Premodernism is often thought of as the time before 1650 A.D.  The dominant theme was metaphysics or the study of being (reality). Modernism then began with Rene Descartes around 1650 and turned attention to epistemology or how we know.  The precise date of Post-modernism is in dispute.  Although its roots go to Friedrich Nietzsche (d. 1900), it did not begin to take shape until around 1950 with Martin Heidegger and began to occupy a front seat in the discussion a decade or two later with Derrida.  The primary focus of Post-modernism is hermeneutics or how to interpret.  The object of interpretation can be history, art, or literature, but deconstructing it is the center of focus.

Someone has illustrated the difference between the three periods of thought by the image of a referee.  The Pre-modern referee says: “I call them like they are.”  The Modern referee claims, “I call them like I see them.”  But the Post-modern referee declares: “They are nothing until I call them.”

Forerunners of Postmodernism

Modern western thought begins with two main streams: empiricism and rationalism.  David Hume represented the former and Rene Descartes the latter.  The empiricists stressed the senses and the rationalist the mind.  The empiricists began a posteriori in sense experience, but the rationalist began a priori with innate ideas in the mind.  Immanuel Kant synthesized the two streams, arguing that the senses provide the content of our knowledge but the mind gives form to it. He claimed that the mind without the senses is empty, but the senses without the mind are blind.  The unfortunate result of his brilliant but tragic synthesis was agnosticism. We cannot know reality as it is in itself but only as it is after it is mediated to us through the senses and formed by the categories in our mind.  Hence, metaphysics—knowing reality in itself—is impossible.

 

Kantian agnosticism gave rise to ren Kierkegaard’s fideism on the one hand and Nietzsche’s atheism on the other hand. Acknowledging the Kantian gulf between appearance and reality, Kierkegaard suggest a “leap of faith” to the “wholly other” God who transcends all capacity to know him with our minds.  Nietzsche, on the other hand preferred not to leap to an unknown God but to pronounce God dead and simply go on willing the eternal recurrence of the same state of affairs forever.

 

In the absence of any absolute Mind to express any absolute meaning, Ludwig Wittgenstein built on Frege’s conventionalism and insisted that we are all locked inside a linguistic bubble which allows us to make no cognitively meaningful statements about the mystical (metaphysical) beyond.  That is to say, without saying God is dead, he insisted that all meaningful talk about God is “dead” (i.e., meaningless).

 

Borrowing Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological method, the later Martin Heidegger posited a new hermeneutic which, giving up on any metaphysical knowledge of reality, attempted to retrieve rays of truth to shine through poetry (particularly that of Friedrich Holderlin). It is out of this context that Jacque Derrida conceived his hermeneutical method of deconstructions by which one deconstructs a text and reconstructs it over and over again.  Before we analyze that more carefully, it will be helpful to contrast Modern and Post-Modern thought in general.

Contrast of Modernism and Post-Modernism

 

As can be seen from the following chart, there is an import shift between modern and post-modern thought.  The general shift is from epistemology to hermeneutics; from absolute truth to relative truth; from seeking the author’s meaning finding to the reader’s meanings; from the structure of the text to destructing the text; from the goal of knowing truth to the journey of knowing:

 

Modernism                              Postmodernism

Unity of thought                      Diversity of thought

Rational                                   Social and psychological

Conceptual                              Visual and poetical

Truth is absolute                     Truth is relative

Exclusivism                             Pluralism

Foundationalism                     Anti-foundationalism

Epistemology                          Hermeneutics

Certainty                                 Uncertainty

Author’s meaning                   Reader’s meanings

Structure of the text                Deconstructing the text

The goal of knowing               The journey of knowing

                                  The Nature of Postmodernism

Postmodernism is a condition where [since God is dead] “anything is possible and nothing is certain” (Vaclav Havel).  Nietzsche pronounced “God is dead,” but there are several different meanings that can be given to this phrase “God is Dead.”  It can mean God is dead–

  1. Epistemologically–Kant
  2. Mythologically—Nietzsche
  3. Dialectically—Hegel
  4. Linguistically—Ayer
  5. Phenomenalogically—Husserl
  6. Existentially–Sartre
  7. Cognitively—Wittgenstein
  8. Hermeneutically—Heidegger/Derrida

Of course, many of these thinkers also believe God is dead actually(e.g., Nietzsche, Sartre, and Derrida), but this is beside the point at hand here, namely, the methodology of Post-Modern deconstructionism.

Jacques Derrida: Post-Modernism

Two of the dominant figures in Post-modernism are Jacque Derrida and Paul-Michel Foucault.  Derrida wrote:  Of Grammatology (‘67); Speech and Phenomena (‘67); Writing and Difference (‘67); Limited Inc. (1970); Post Card: From Socrates, Freud and Beyond (1972); Specters of Marx (1994).

        Foucault wrote: Madness and Civilization (1961); Death and Labyrinth (1963); The Order of Things (1966); Discipline and Punish (1975);Archaeology of Knowledge (1976), and History of Sexuality (1976-1984).
The starting point for their post-modern thought was Nietzsche’s death of God.  For if

If there is no Absolute Mind, then there is-

  1. No absolute truth (epistemological relativism)
  2. No absolute meaning (semantical relativism)
  3. No absolute history (reconstructionism)

And if there is no Absolute Author, then there is—

  1. No absolute writing (textual relativism)
  2. No absolute interpretation (hermeneutical relativism)

And if there is no Absolute Thinker, then there is—

  1. No absolute thought (philosophical relativism)
  2. No absolute laws of thought (anti-foundationalism)

And if there is no Absolute Purposer, then there is—

  1. No absolute purpose (teleological relativism)

If there is no Absolute Good, then there is—

  1. No absolute right or wrong (moral relativism)

The Death of All Absolute Values in Post-Modernism

“Without God and the future life?  How will man be after that? It means everything is permitted now” (The Brothers Karamazov, Vintage, 1991, p. 589).  As Jean Paul Sartre put it, “I knew myself alone, utterly alone in the midst of this well-meaning little universe of yours.  I was like a man who’s lost his shadow.  And there was nothing left in heaven, no right or wrong, nor anyone to give me orders” (Sartre, The Flies, 121-122 in No Exit and Three Other Plays).  Aldous Huxley acknowledge this same conclusion when he wrote, “The liberation we desired was simultaneously liberation from a certain political and economic system and liberation from a certain system of morality.  We objected to the morality because it interfered with our sexual freedom” (Ends and Means, 272).

Perhaps no one described it better than Bertrand Russell when he wrote of a world without God:  “Man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving…. His origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and his beliefs, are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms…. All the noonday brightness of human genius, are destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar system…. Only within the scaffolding of these truths, only on the firm foundation of unyielding despair, can the soul’s habitation henceforth be safely built” (Bertrand Russell, “A Free Man’s Worship” (in The Basic Writings of Bertrand Russell, 67).

In short, the root of Post-modernism is atheism and the fruit of it is relativism—relativism in every area of life and thought.  Of particular interest is the post-modern attack on foundationalism, history, and textual interpretation and how this has affected Christian thought.

The Attack on Foundationalism

Foundationalism is the view that there are fundamental self-evident first principles which form the basis of all knowledge. It is at least as old as Plato and Aristotle in the Western world, though it has been the unwitting foundation of Christian Thought from the beginning of time.

There is an important distinction between two basic kinds of foundationalism often neglected by post-modern thought.  There is deductive foundationalism and reductive foundationalism.

Deductive foundationalism springs from modern rationalist like Benedict Spinoza and Rene Descartes.  It is based on a Euclidian geometric model whereby certain axioms are defined as self-evident and all other truth is deduced from them.  The problem with this is that not all axioms are necessary.  Different axioms are possible, both in mathematics and philosophy. Further, these rational axioms are empty.  They yield no knowledge about reality.  For example, saying “All triangles have three sides” does not tell us there are any triangles.  It merely says that if there are any triangles, then by definition they must have three sides.

Reductive foundationalism finds roots in Aristotle and was embraced by the great Christian thinker Thomas Aquinas.  It states that all truths are reducible to (or based on) self-evident first principles. Every statement not evident in itself must be evident in terms of something else. But there cannot be an infinite regress of non-evident statements. For an endless regress of explanations is nothing more than an attempt to explain away the need for an explanation.  Hence, there must be first self-evident statements in terms of which non-evident statements are known to be true.

First principles of knowledge are self-evident.  That is, they are a statement where the predicate term is reducible to the subject term, though not always deducible from it. The basic laws of thought include the following:

Several things are noteworthy about these first principles of thought.

First, they are all first principles of thought and being.  Why?  Because “If there were an infinite regress in demonstration, demonstration would be impossible, because the conclusion of any demonstration is made certain by reducing it to the first principle of demonstration” (Aquinas, Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, 244).  Or, as C. S. Lewis aptly put it, “You cannot go on ‘explaining away’ forever: you will find that you have explained explanation itself away.  You cannot go on ‘seeing through’ things forever. The whole point of seeing through something is to see something through it.  It is good that the window should be transparent, because the street or garden beyond it is opaque.  How if you saw through the garden too?  It is no use trying to see through first principles.  If you see through everything, then everything is transparent.  But a wholly transparent world is an invisible world.  To ‘see through’ all things is the same as not to see” (The Abolition of Man, 91).

Second, they self-evident in the reductive sense. That is, there predicate is reducible to their subject.  So that once one understand the meaning of the subject and predicate he can immediately see that they are self-evident.  For example, once one knows what the words “bachelor” and “unmarried” mean, then he knows immediately that “all bachelors are unmarried men.”  Likewise, once one knows this is a three-sided figure, then he sees immediately that it is a triangle.

Third, they are also undeniable.  That is, every attempt to deny them, affirms them (at least implicitly) in that attempted denial.  Take, for example, the Law of Existence.  I cannot deny that something exist without existing to make the denial.  The claim that I do not exists, implies that I do exist to make the denial.

Fourth, these first principles apply to all of reality.  They are metaphysical first principles.  Unlike deductive foundationalism, they are not empty and vacuous.  They are first principles of being (reality). They begin with something exists.

Fifth, from these principles one can demonstrate the existence and central attributes of God. For if something exists (#1), and if nothing cannot cause something (#5), then something eternal and necessary must exists. And whatever else exists, then it must be similar to God in its being (#7).  But not all being is a necessary being (#6). For example, I am a contingent being, that is, I am, but I might not be.  My non-existence is possible.  But I am a knowing and moral being (which is undeniable).  Hence there must be an eternal and necessary Being who is a knowing and moral Being that exists (i.e., God).  And if God exists, then absolute thought, values, and meaning also exists.  In short, post-modernism is wrong.

 

A Critique of Postmodernism

 

            This critique can be applied to other areas of post-modern thought, for example, to deconstructionism in history and textual interpretation.  Let’s briefly apply it to history.

 

A Critique of Post-Modern View of History

 

According to a post-modern view of history, we must deconstruct all historical accounts of the past since they are relative and not objective.  This, of course, would be destructive of  orthodox Christianity since it is a historic religion.  We believe, as the Apostles’ Creed says, that Jesus “was born of the Virgin Mary, suffered under Pontius Pilate, was crucified, died, and was buried… [and] the third day He arose again from the dead.”  These are all historical claims, and if history is unknowable, then we cannot know these to be true.  But is history really unknowable?  Let’s briefly examine the post-modern arguments for the unknowability of history. One historical relativist said, “The event itself, the facts, do not say anything, do not impose any meaning. It is the historian who speaks, who imposes a meaning” (Carl L. Becker, “What Are Historical Facts?” in The Philosophy of History in Our Time, p. 131).

However, there is a serious self-defeating problem with this claim.  How can one know that something is not objective history unless he has an objective knowledge of history that enables him to say that a particular view of history is not objective.  One cannot know not-that unless he knows that.  And he cannot know not-objective history unless he knows objective history.  Second, it is self-defeating to deny objectivity in history.  Even Charles Beard, the apostle of historical relativity himself, wrote: “Contemporary criticism shows that the apostle of relativity is destined to be destroyed by the child of his own brain.”  For, “If all historical conceptions are merely relative to passing events…then the conceptions of relativity is itself relative.”  In short, “the apostle of relativity will surely be executed by his own logic” (Meyerhoff ed., The Philosophy of History in Our Time, 138, emphasis added).

 A Critique of a Post-modern Views of Hermeneutics

There are several characteristics of a deconstructionists view of interpretation.

First, it is based in conventionalism.  This is  the view that all meaning is culturally relative.  However, this too is self-defeating for if “all meaning is culturally relative” then even this statement would be culturally relative.  Yet it claims to be a statement about cultural relativity not one of cultural relativity.

Second, post-modern hermeneutic claims that there is no objective meaning.  For all statements are made from a subjective perspective.  However, this too is self-destructive for it amount to saying that it is an objective statement about meaning that no statements are objectively meaningful.

Third, it denies that there is a correspondence between our statements and their object. This denies the correspondence view of truth.  But the problem with denying that truth corresponds to reality is that this very denial claims to correspond to reality.  So, one cannot deny statements correspond to reality without making a statement he believes corresponds to reality.

Fourth, post-modern hermeneutics is a form of linguistic solipsism.  Following Wittgenstein, Derrida believes that we are locked inside of language in a kind of linguistic bubble and cannot get out.  However, this is a form of the “nothing-buttery” fallacy.  For all statements that imply we can know nothing but what is inside the linguistic bubble imply that we have knowledge ofmore than what is inside the bubble.  Like the Kantian contradiction, one cannot know about reality that he cannot know anything about reality.  Language is not a wall that bars us from reality; it is a window that expresses the reality we know.

This linguistic solipsism fallacy is based on the failure to recognize that creation is analogous to the Creator.  There must be a similarity between the Cause of finite being and the Infinite Being that caused it.  For one cannot give what he does not have to give.  He cannot produce what he does not produce.  Thus, the Source of all being must be similar to the being that he brings into being.[1]

Fifth, according to post-modernism, logic is language dependent.  The laws of thought are, therefore, culturally dependent.  But this is clearly contrary to fact—the fact that language is based on logic, not the reverse.  For the basic laws of thought (enumerated above) operate in ever language and culture, as do the basic laws of mathematics.  Logic transcends culture and makes cross-cultural communication possible.  The very claim that the Law of Non-contradiction is not applicable to all cultures is itself a non-contradictory statement about all cultures.

Sixth, another post-modern hermeneutical premise is that meaning is determined by the reader, not by the author.  For they claim that every text is understood in a context and every reader brings a new context to the text.  Hence, it is not the meaning of the author that is the true meaning of a text by the meanings of the readers.  However, here again we are faced with a self-stultifying claim.  For no post-modernist desires us to give our meaning(s) to his words. He expects us to take the meaning of his words (i.e., the author’s meaning).  So, the denial that the author’s meaning is the correct meaning implies that the authors’ meaning is the correct meaning.

The Problems with Post-modernism

In summation, the problems with post-modernism are: (1) It can’t be thought consistently; (2) It can’t be spoken consistently, and (3) It cannot be lived consistency.  Why? Because it is based on atheism, and atheism cannot be thought, spoken, or lived consistently.  Evidence for the inability to live atheism consistently comes from the lives of atheists themselves. 

Evidence for atheists that atheism cannot be lived consistently

Atheist Jean Paul Sartre wrote, “I reached out for religion, I longed for it, it was the remedy. Had it been denied me, I would have invented it myself… I needed a Creator….” (The Words, 102).   Atheist Albert Camus added,   “For anyone who is alone, without God and without a master, the weight of days is dreadful” (The Fall, 133).  Even Nietzsche wrote a poem to an “Unknown God,” crying out:  “Unknown one! Speak. What wilt thou, unknown-god?… Do come back With all thy tortures! To the last of all that are lonely, Oh, come back!… And my heart’s final flame –Flares up for thee! Oh, come back, My unknown god! My pain! My last–happiness!” (Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Part Four, “The Magician”).

Bertrand Russell expressed a revealing moment when he wrote to a lady friend, “Even when one feels nearest to other people, something in one seems obstinately to belong to God…–at least that is how I should express it if I thought there was a God.  It is odd, isn’t it? I care passionately for this world and many things and people in it, and yet…what is it all?” There must be something more important one feels, though I don’t believe there is” (emphasis is his).

A number of years, before the iron curtain was lifted, while I was returning from Europe, I was given Time magazine.  The cover caught my attention.  It read: “God is Dead; Marx is dead, and I am not feeling too well either” (Timecover, European edition, 1978). Nietzsche wrote, “I hold up before myself the images of Dante and Spinoza, who were better at accepting the lot of solitude. Of course, their way of thinking, compared to mine, was one which made solitude bearable; and in the end, for all those who somehow still had a “God” for company…. My life now consists in the wish that it might be otherwise…and that somebody might make my “truths” appear incredible to me…” (Letter to Overbeck, 7/2/1865).

Even David Hume could not live his skepticism.  He wrote:  “Most fortunately it happens, that since reason is incapable of dispelling these clouds [of doubt], nature herself suffices to that purpose, and cures me of the philosophical melancholy and delirium…” (A Treatise on Human Nature1.4.7).  So, what did he do?  He said, “I dine, I play a game of backgammon, I converse…; and when after three or four hours’ amusement, I would return to these speculations, they appear so cold, and strained, and ridiculous, that I cannot find in my heart to enter into them any farther” (ibid. 1.4.7).

Famous unbelieving historian and philosopher Will Durant wrote: “I survive morally because I retain the moral code that was taught me along with the religion, while I discarded the religion….  You and I are living on a shadow…. But what will happen to our children…? They are living on the shadow of a shadow” (Chicago Sun-Times 8/24/75 1B).

The British Humanist Magazine charged that Humanism is almost “clinically detached from life.”  It recommends they develop a humanist Bible, a humanist hymnal, Ten Commandments for humanists, and even confessional practices!  In addition, “the use of hypnotic techniques–music and other psychological devices–during humanist services would give the audience that deep spiritual experience and they would emerge refreshed and inspired   with their humanist faith…” (1964). I have composed some hymns for them: “Socrates, Lover of My Soul,” “No One Ever Care for Me like Plato,” and “My hope is built on nothing less than Jean Paul Sartre and nothingness”! A hymn for a Post-modernists might read like this:

                           “Open my eyes that I may see,

                   More of my own subjectivity.

                           Help me, Derrida, ever to be

                  All absorbed in uncertainty.

                           Then I’ll know what it is to be

                        Lost forever in postmodernity.”

In summary, when atheists themselves evaluate atheism they conclude it like living on s a “shadow of a shadow.”  It is not “bearable.”  It is “dreadful,”even “cruel.” It even leads to “delirium.” The main point is that postmodernism is not only unthinkable and unspeakable, but it is unlivable.

Atheist Albert Camus declared that “Nothing can discourage the appetite for divinity in the heart of man” (Camus, The Rebel, 147).  Blaise Pascal insisted that there is a God-sized vacuum in the human heart which nothing but God can fill.  He wrote: “What else does this craving, and this helplessness, proclaim but that there was once in man a true happiness, of which all that now remains is the empty print and trace? This he tries in vain to fill with everything around him… though none can help, since this infinite abyss can be filled only with an infinite and immutable object; in other words by God himself” (Pascal, Pensees # 425). Former Atheist Francis Collins who headed up the human genome project asked:  “Why would such a universal and uniquely human hunger [for God] exist, if it were not connected to some opportunity for fulfillment?… Creatures are not born with desires unless satisfaction for those desires exists.  A baby feels hunger: well, there is such a thing as food.  A duckling wants to swim: well there is such a thing as water” (The Language of God, 38).  So, if there is a God-sized vacuum in the human heart, then nothing smaller than God will be able to fill it.

Atheist Sigmund Freud claimed that “What is characteristic of illusions is that they are derived from human wishes.”  As for “religious doctrines,” “all of them are illusions and insusceptible of proof” (The Future of an Illusion, 49-50). However, as it turns out it is the atheist who has the illusion.  For Freud never made a study of believers on which he based his view.  On the contrary, recent studies show that belief in God leads to a better and happier life. Former Freudian did a study of great atheist and found that they were fatherless wither actually of functionally and that, rather than believers creating the Father (God), atheists are attempting to kill the Father (Paul Vitz, Faith of the Fatherless). He wrote, “Indeed, there is a coherent psychological origin to intense atheism” (p. 3). “Therefore, in the Freudian framework, atheism is an illusion caused by the Oedipal desire to kill the father (God) and replace him with oneself” (p. 13).

Indeed, in Nietzsche’s famous quote about “God is dead” the next line is “and we have killed him.”  French existential atheist Jean Paul Sartre, illustrates the point in his own autobiography when he wrote: “I had all the more difficulty of getting rid of him in that he had installed himself at the back of my head.… I collared the Holy Ghost in the cellar and threw him out; atheism is a cruel and long-range affair; I think I’ve carried it through. I lost my illusion” (The Words, 252-253).

However, even though Sartre had given up on God, God had not given up on him.  Before Sartre’s death he is recorded as saying, “I do not feel that I am the product of chance, a speck  of dust in the universe, but someone who was expected, prepared, prefigured.  In short, a being whom only a Creator could put here” (National Review, 11 June, 1982, p. 677).  Indeed, Sartre was disowned by his own mistress as a “turncoat” and visited by a Christian minister regularly before his death.  I have in my file a letter from missionaries in France who knew Sartre who had expressed to them his regret on how many young people he had led astray with his atheistic thought.

 


 

[1] Of course, there must be a difference between Creator and creature since He is an infinite kind of Being and we are finite beings.  He is a Being with no potentiality for non-being, and we are contingent beings which have the possibility not to be.  God is Pure Actuality (with no potential not to exist), and all creatures are actualities with the potentiality not to exist.

Copyright © 2012 Norman L. Geisler – All rights reserved


Further resources:

A History of Western Philosophy Vol. 1

A History of Western Philosophy Vol. 2